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INFORMED CONSENT FOR THE MAN ON 

THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS: AN ENGLISH 

CURE FOR "THE AMERICAN 

DISEASE"? 

FRANCES H. MILLER* 
The English I often express distaste for American-style medical 
malpractice litigation. It has been referred to as "the American dis­
ease,"2 and the English judiciary sometimes prides itself on resistance 
to the plague. 3 Although precise comparative statistics are difficult to 
obtain, approximately ten times as many claims for medical malprac­
tice are filed against American physicians as are filed against their 
counterparts in England.4 Differences in legal rules, among many 
other factors, explain why the English medical malpractice litigation 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Professor of Public 
Health, Boston University School of Medicine; A.B., Mount Holyoke College, 1960; J.D., 
Boston University School of Law, 1965. Research for this article was supported in part by 
a fellowship from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. Professor Ian Kennedy, King's College, 
London, made valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
I. This article deals primarily with the law of England and Wales; the use of the term 
England hereafter includes Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland, the rest of the United 
Kingdom, have their own separate legal systems. 
2. C. HAWKINS, MISHAP OR MALPRACTICE? 245 (1985); Barnett, "Medical Mal­
practice: The American Disease. Is It Infectious?" Address by the Secretary of the Medi­
cal Defence Union to the Royal Society of Medicine (Feb. 14, 1980), reprinted in 48 J. 
MED. LEGAL Soc. 63 (1980). See also Kennedy, The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus, 47 
MOD. L. REV. 454, 465 (1984) (commenting on the real reasons why the Court of Appeal 
failed to adopt the reasonable patient standard of disclosure in Sidaway v. Board of Gover­
nors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778 (C.A.». 
3. See, e.g., Lim Poh Choo v. Camden Health Auth., [1979] 1 Q.B. 196,217 (C.A.) 
(Lord Denning, dissenting) ("[I]f these [medical malpractice awards] get too large, we are 
in danger of injuring the body politic: just as medical malpractice cases have done in the 
United States of America."). 
4. In 1981 an estimated 800 writs for medical malpractice were issued in England 
and Wales, which have a population approximately one-fifth that of the United States. 
ACTION FOR THE VICTIMS OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1983-84, 3. Two 
years later approximately 42,000 claims were made against U.S. physicians for medical 
malpractice. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFES­
SIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE 80's, Report I, 10 
(1984). 
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experience differs so markedly from that of the U.S. 5 Taken together, 
they establish that there is little chance that the malady, such as it is, 
will cross the Atlantic in full-blown infectious state.6 
One of these differences in legal rules-at least in part---concems 
the doctrine of infonned consent, which for purposes of this article 
means consent based on disclosure of the risks as well as the benefits of 
proposed medical intervention.7 In contrast to the United States, 
where each jurisdiction can adopt its own common law or statutory 
standards for securing an infonned consent,8 the English House of 
Lords has just laid down a relatively conservative rule that binds the 
entire country.9 In the first-impression case of Sidaway v. Board of 
5. See Miller, Medical Malpractice: Do the English Have a Better Remedy?, 12 AM. 
J.L. & MED., 433 (1986). 
6. See generally Grubb, A Survey ofMedical Malpractice Law in England: "Crisis? 
What Crisis?," I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 75 (1985); Lejeune, Malpractice 
Mania: Not Britain's Cup of Tea, PRIVATE PRAC., Feb. 1986, at 12. 
7. See generally Meisel, The Exceptions to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a 
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 413 
(discussion of informed consent). 
8. Approximately one quarter of the states have adopted a prudent patient standard 
of disclosure. T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, MEDICAL ETHICS: THE MORAL RE­
SPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS (1980). See also D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 11 22.1522.65 (1985). 
9. On the binding effect of House of Lords decisions, see, 22 HALSBURY'S LAWS 798­
99 § 1686 (3d ed. 1958). English appeals court decisions do not come neatly labeled in 
terms of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. For example, it is not unusual for 
each of the five Law Lords who ordinarily make up the bench on appeals to the House of 
Lords to issue his own opinion, which is referred to as a speech. (There are fifteen Law 
Lords altogether and a quorum consists of three judges. Five Law Lords, often chosen for 
their experience with the issues under review, usually hear each appeal.) This may differ 
ever so slightly-or sometimes more radically-from those of his Peers. Since opinions are 
issued in order of seniority, the first Law Lord to speak may in fact turn out to be a dis­
senter. Only after reading all the speeches can the holding be determined, and the precise 
rule of law emerging from the case may prove elusive since each judge usually gives his own 
shade of meaning to the rationale even when all reach the same result. See generally, A. 
PETTERSON, THE LAW LORDS (1982). See Bradney, The Changing Face of the House of 
Lords, JURID. REV., Dec. 1985, at 178 (analysis of the influence of individual judges be­
tween 1974-84). 
Decisions from the Court of Appeal, the intermediate appellate tribunal wherein cases 
are usually heard by panels composed of three Lords Justice, take the same form. (There 
are seventeen Court of Appeal justices, plus the Chief Judge and the Master of the Rolls.) 
See generally P. W. D. RODMOND, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW 34 (1981). 
Since the composition of judicial panels on appeal varies, it can sometimes be difficult to 
make an educated prediction about what will happen to a case when it goes up. As a result, 
barristers are keenly attuned to the make-up of the bench in individual appeals. According 
to Sidney Templeman, Q.c., now, ironically, a Law Lord, "I think the whole of our profes­
sion [barristers] is really concerned with judge management. Most of the cases are terribly 
difficult and very nicely poised and they nearly all turn on about ten minutes of the argu­
ment." Id. at 232 n.l14. There was little uncertainty, however, about the result to be 
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Governors ofBethlem Royal Hospital, \0 the Lords through a variety of 
rationales adopted a physician-oriented rather than a patient-centered 
standard of disclosure. In essence, the majority decreed that a physi­
cian's duty to warn is measured by what other doctors tell their other 
patients. The "man on the Clapham omnibus," as the English reason­
able man is called, II is not entitled to be told anything that his doctor 
chooses not to disclose, so long as a responsible body of medical pro­
fessionals would sanction the choice to withhold information and the 
jUdiciary does not find it impossible to support that choice. 12 
English judicial deference to medical paternalism has its roots in 
a system of government-provided medical care quite different from 
that generally operating in the United States. 13 It is also heavily influ­
enced by cultural normsl4 and financial constraints l5 unlike those to 
be found in this country. Moreover, since English juries no longer 
decide personal injury cases,16 the man who steps off the Clapham 
omnibus has no opportunity to take a seat on the jury and have his say 
about such issues as medical negligence and appropriate damages. In 
expected from the House of Lords in a case like Sidaway. See Robertson, Informed Con­
sent to Medical Treatment, 97 LAW Q. REv. 102, 125-26 (1981). 
10. [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. Apparently only two other English decisions had even 
discussed the doctrine of informed consent in terms of an obligation to disclose risks prior 
to Sidaway. See Chatterton v. Gerson, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 1003; Hills v. Potter, [1984] 1 
W.L.R. 641. For an interesting analysis of the House of Lords' decision in Sidaway, see 
Tetr, Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-Determination or Therapeutic Alli­
ance?, 101 LAW Q. REV. 432 (1985). 
11. Bolam v. Friem Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-88. 
12. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 491. Physicians, who along with their judicial 
brethren presumably rarely ride the Clapham omnibus, are held to a higher standard of 
care than the ordinary man. See Bolam, [1957] I W.L.R. 582. 
13. For a general description of the functions of the National Health Service, see J. 
GOODMAN, NATIONAL HEALTH CARE IN GREAT BRITAIN: LESSONS FOR THE U.S.A. 
(1980). See also Stevens, The Evolution ofthe Health-Care Systems in the United States and 
the United Kingdom: Similarities and Differences, in FOGARTY INTERNATIONAL CENTER 
PROCEEDINGS, No. 40, at 13 (1977). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 92-106. 
15. Great Britain limits total National Health Service (NHS) expenditures through 
strictly controlled prospective budgeting. Health resource allocation within the NHS is 
therefore a zero sum gain in which spending in one area necessarily reduces funds available 
for use elsewhere. See Miller & Miller, The Painful Prescription: A Procrustean Perspec­
tive?, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383 (1986). The Court of Appeal in R. v. Sec'yof State for 
Social Services, ex p. Hincks [1979] 123 Sol. J. 436, held that patients on waiting lists for 
orthopedic surgery had no cause of action against the NHS for failing to make necessary 
health care facilities available. The court held that budgetary limits must be read into the 
statutory duty to run the NHS. 
16. The right to trial by jury in civil cases, unless required by statute, was abolished 
in Ward v. James, [1966] I Q.B. 273 (CA.). On the historical development of jury trials in 
England, see P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956). 
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a society where class distinctions continue to be officially recognized,17 
solicitude for a sister profession carries subliminal weight when judges 
find the facts, apply the law, and award the damages as they do in 
medical malpractice actions. 
This article briefly analyzes English law regarding informed con­
sent, culminating in the Sidaway opinion. IS It then examines the cul­
tural and financial reasons which contribute to a different societal 
attitude toward the medical profession in England than that which 
generally prevails in the United States. Finally, it discusses whether 
the model of shared medical decisionmaking set forth in Professor Jay 
Katz's The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient 19 can be applied to the 
English situation. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT LAW IN ENGLAND 
A. Pre-Sidaway Case Law 
For purposes of this article the term "informed consent" refers to 
a patient's acquiescence in medical treatment based on at least some 
disclosure of the risks inherent in the proposed course of action. It 
entails a duty to disclose which goes beyond a mere description of the 
"general nature and purpose" of the doctor's recommendation, but 
does not necessarily encompass a reasonable patient standard of dis­
closure.20 English case law long has recognized a cause of action for 
trespass to the person if medical procedures are performed with no 
consent at alpl It also has recognized the possibility of an action for 
negligence if the patient is not told the general nature and purpose of a 
proposed medical intervention in advance.22 Only recently, however, 
have English courts begun to indicate that physicians have an explicit 
17. For example, social class is categorized by occupation rather than by income in 
Great Britain. See, e.g., Dead Reckoning, Dead Wrong, THE EcONOMIST, Aug. 9, 1986, at 
39. C/, A Middling Sort of Country, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. II, 1986, at 52. 
18. For pre-Sidaway discussions of the law relating to informed consent, see, e.g., 
Robertson, supra note 9; Samuels, What the Doctor Must Tell the Patient, 22 MED. SCI. L. 
41 (1982); Skegg, Informed Consent to Medical Procedures, 15 MED. SCI. L. 124 (1975); 
Skegg, A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent, 90 LAW Q. REV. 
512 (1974). 
19. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
20. Some English judges use the term informed consent to apply only to the reason­
able patient standard of disclosure. See Lord Justice Dunn's Court of Appeal opinion in 
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984]2 W.L.R. 778, 795 (C.A.); 
see infra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
21. Hamilton v. Birmingham R.H.B., [1969] 2 Brit. Med. J. 456; Cull v. Butler, 
[1932] I Brit. Med. J. 1195. 
22. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] I W.L.R. 582. 
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duty to disclose the inherent risks associated with their 
recommendations. 
The 1980 case of Chatterton v. Gerson 23 seems to be the first 
reported opinion to hold that a doctor "ought to warn of what may 
happen by misfortune, however well the operation is done, if there is a 
real risk of misfortune inherent in the procedure."24 This duty to 
warn was derived from the physician's general duty of care, however, 
rather than from the patient's right to receive information.25 The 
court found that the physician's duty stemmed from his professional 
obligation to exercise the care of a responsible doctor in similar cir­
cumstances, as set forth in the landmark case of Bolam v. Friern Hos­
pital Management Committee. 26 Thus the Chatterton court saw what 
other doctors think necessary for their patients to know as the mea­
sure of a defendant-doctor's duty to disclose. The court defined a 
"real" risk to mean one the medical profession judged important 
enough to warrant raising with patients, rather than one patients on 
their own would consider significant. 
The post-Chatterton case of Hills v. Potter 27 seems to be the only 
other opinion concerning a physician's duty to disclose risks reported 
prior to the House of Lords decision in Sidaway, except for the Court 
of Appeal opinion in Sidaway itself.28 The plaintiff in Hills was para­
lyzed following an operation to correct a neck deformity and asserted 
that the defendant had never told her that she might be worse off fol­
lowing the operation. All three neurosurgeons testifying as expert wit­
nesses stated that they would have informed a patient of no more than 
the plaintiff testified the defendant told her, and the trial court found 
that no warning concerning possible paralysis was given at all. 29 The 
23. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 1003. 
24. Id. at 1014. 
25. England does not have a written constitution specifically protecting the rights of 
the individual, and the common law has tended to focus more on developing the concept of 
duties owed to others by members of society than on the rights of societal members per se. 
See generally H. CALVERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1985). 
26. [1957] I W.L.R. 582. 
27. [1984] I W.L.R. 641. 
28. Freeman v. Home Office, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 802 (C.A.). Freeman was decided by 
the Court of Appeal just after its decision in Sidaway. The case concerned the administra­
tion of behavior modification drugs to a prisoner allegedly without consent. Although 
Lord Justice Brown stated: "[In light of Sidaway] it is not open to ... [the plaintiff] to 
argue that 'informed consent' is a consideration which can be entertained by the courts of 
this country," id. at 811, the case did not concern the doctrine in the context of ordinary 
medical treatment. 
29. Hills, [1984] I W.L.R. at 643. 
174 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:169 
court specifically rejected the "North American doctrine of informed 
consent," by which it meant the "prudent patient" test, and held that 
the professional standard of practice applies to a doctor's duty to dis­
close in the same manner that it applies to duties with respect to diag­
nosis and treatment.30 In other words, physicians need only tell their 
patients what other doctors think is enough for patients to know. Jus­
tice Hirst found himself unable to distinguish between medical advice, 
on the one hand, and medical diagnosis and treatment on the other, 
with respect to the standard of care demanded from the profession.31 
In any event, as a trial court judge he considered himself bound by the 
reasonable physician precedent established by Bolam. Bolam had in­
cluded a claim for negligent failure to warn about the dangers of elec­
troshock therapy, but the Queen's Bench held that a doctor's duty 
does not necessarily entail warning of the risks of proposed treatment. 
Only if other doctors would warn their patients under similar circum­
stances would the defendant be required to do so. 
B. The Sidaway Decision 
The facts of the Sidaway case, as found by the trial court, were 
quite simple. The plaintiff had suffered persistent neck and shoulder 
pain stemming from a work-related 'accident in 1958, when she was 
fifty-eight years old. The defendant surgeon, Mr. Falconer,32 per­
formed a spinal disc operation on her in 1960, which ultimately re­
lieved her discomfort for several years. In 1973, Mr. Falconer wrote 
to the patient inquiring how she was, and the plaintiff informed him 
that the original pain had returned. 
Mrs. Sidaway was admitted to the hospital for evaluation and a 
myelogram revealed another disc problem. In Lord Scarman's words, 
"Mr. Falconer diagnosed that pressure on a nerve root was the cause 
of her pain and decided to operate."33 According to the trial court, 
Mr. Falconer was a "reserved, slightly autocratic man 'of the old 
school',"34 but since he died prior to trial there was no way to ascer­
tain his version of what warnings were actually given to Mrs. Sidaway 
30, See Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Auth., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634 
(diagnosis); Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1981] I W.L.R. 246 (treatment). 
31. Hills, [1984]1 W.L.R. at 652. 
32. Surgeons are addressed as Mr. in England, whereas all other M.D.s are called 
Dr. 
33. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480, 
484 (emphasis added). 
34. Sidaway, High (trial) Court decision by Mr. Justice Skinner delivered on Febru­
ary 19, 1982, reported in Schwartz & Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 19. 
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before surgery.35 The plaintiff denied being informed of any risks, but 
the trial court specifically found that on the balance of probabilities 
"the day before the operation ... [the defendant] followed his usual 
practice . . . and explained the nature of the operation in simple 
terms.... As to the risks, ... [the judge was] satisfied that he did not 
refer to the danger of cord damage or to the fact that this was an 
operation of choice rather than necessity."36 
Mrs. Sidaway's spinal cord was damaged during surgery, and she 
became partially paralyzed as a result. She did not allege negligence in 
Mr. Falconer's performance of the procedure, but claimed instead that 
he failed to exercise due care with respect to the information he gave 
her prior to the operation. 37 Expert testimony established that the 
risk of spinal cord damage was in the range of one to two per cent. 38 
It also established that a responsible body of medical opinion would 
sanction telling the plaintiff nothing more than what the trial court 
found the defendant probably had told Mrs. Sidaway.39 The issue on 
appeal was thus squarely whether professional custom should deter­
mine the standard of disclosure for consent to medical procedures, or 
wheth'er the American "prudent patient" test should be adopted 
instead. 
Three opinions were delivered in the Court of Appeal decision of 
Sidaway,40 all finding for the defendant. Sir John Donaldson, the 
Master of the Rolls,41 delivered the first opinion, specifically rejecting 
what he referred to as the "American" test for the standard of disclo­
sure. He said, "No doubt ... [the prudent patient test] is valid if the 
doctor happens to be treating that happy abstraction, the 'prudent pa­
tient,' but I suspect that he is a fairly rare bird and I have no doubt 
35. The plaintiff had signed a routine consent form stating that the nature and pur­
pose of the operation had been explained to her by one Dr. Goudzari, who testified that he 
had provided such general information, but that he left warning of the risks to the defend­
ant. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 486. 
36. Id. at 486 (quoting from transcript of the High Court proceedings). 
37. Id. at 485-86. 
38. Id. at 485. 
39. Id. at 486. 
40. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778 
(C.A.). For a trenchant critique of the Court ofAppeal decision, see Kennedy, supra note 
2. See also Annas, Why the British Courts Rejected the American Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1286 (1984); Grubb, Medical Law-Doctors' Advice and 
the Reasonable Man: Do We Need a Second Opinion?, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 240 (1984); 
Hodgkinson, Medical Treatment: Informing Patients ofMaterial Risks, 1984 PUB. L. 414; 
Jones, Doctor Knows Best?, 100 LAW Q. REV. 355 (1984). 
41. The Master of the Rolls is the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal, directly 
below the House of Lords. On the organization of the British judiciary generally, see P. W. 
D. RODMOND, supra note 9. 
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that his removal to the courts from his natural habitat, which would, I 
assume, be a seat or hand rail on the Clapham omnibus, would do 
nothing for patients or medicine, although it might do a great deal for 
lawyers and litigation."42 
The Master of the Rolls chose amusing language to make his 
point, and it conveys many messages, not all of them intended. First 
and foremost, it implies that medical malpractice litigation is in some 
way unmeritorious, and that the bar cannot be trusted to act respon­
sibly in this area. Second, it acknowledges that patients present in 
highly individualized situations, a factor which one might think would 
militate in favor of allowing patients to make their own medical deci­
sions. Third, the words convey a surprisingly condescending attitude 
toward the time-honored reasonable man, who cannot be counted 
upon to act prudently when it comes to making decisions about his 
own health. 
This is the same man on the Clapham omnibus, however, whose 
conduct in other areas sets the standard by which almost everyone 
else's behavior is measured.43 The medical profession has always been 
held to a higher standard of care with respect to diagnosis and treat­
ment than the man on the Clapham omnibus would be, because doc­
tors presumably possess more sophisticated skills than does the 
ordinary public traveler. Our bus rider is emasculated in deference to 
medical paternalism, however, when it comes to deciding whether to 
accept his doctor's recommendations. If he is entitled to be informed 
only about what the medical profession chooses to tell him, is it not 
ironic for the law to make him take sole responsibility for the conse­
quences when he merely follows his doctor's advice? 
Although the Master of the Rolls opted for a professional stan­
dard of disclosure, he did acknowledge that "the law will not permit 
the medical profession to play God."44 By that he meant that the 
jUdiciary retains the option to second-guess customary physician be­
havior when it is "manifestly wrong" in some abstract sense, appar­
ently easily discernible by judges.4s Thus in the Master of the Rolls' 
hierarchy of medical decisionmaking, patients are relatively powerless, 
42. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 791. 
43. Bolam v. Friem Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-88. 
44. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 791. 
45. Id. The transatlantic case of Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 
(1974), wherein the Supreme Court of Washington told ophthalmologists what test must be 
performed to protect patients under the age of forty from glaucoma, would thus presump­
tively meet with the Master of the Rolls' approval. 
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doctors control the information flow, and English judges reserve for 
themselves the prerogatives of the deity. 
Lord Justice Dunn's Court of Appeal opinion in Sidaway minced 
no words in holding that "[t]he doctrine of informed consent forms no 
part of English law."46 Lord Justice Dunn reached that conclusion 
"with no regret"47 for two reasons. In essence, he indulged in 
counterintuitive logic by saying that the relationship of confidence and 
trust between doctor and patient would be damaged if doctors were 
required to disclose material risks. Since in his view most patients 
"prefer to put themselves unreservedly in the hands of their doc­
tors,"48 presumably they would be frightened if they really under­
stood what their doctors were doing. Moreover, he worried about the 
impact of a patient-centered standard of disclosure on the practice of 
defensive medicine. Patients would suffer, because instead of "concen­
trat[ing] on their primary duty of treating their patients," doctors 
"would inevitably be concerned to safeguard themselves."49 This 
view is not exactly a vote of confidence for a profession which is sup­
posed to have fiduciary responsibilities for the welfare of patients. 
Lord Justice Brown-Wilkinson premised his Court of Appeal re­
marks-which are generally considered to constitute the lead opin­
ion-on the notion that patients have the right to decide whether to 
go forward with therapy. 50 He too, however, felt that doctors should 
be the arbiters of exactly which risks should be disclosed to their pa­
tients. Too much disclosure might impair patient confidence in the 
medical profession, which Lord Justice Brown-Wilkinson considered 
an essential element in effecting "cures." In essence, he placed great 
emphasis on the psychological aspect of physician-patient interac­
tion-on what Professor Katz would term the "magical" qualities of 
the therapeutic relationship-although he did give lip service to the 
principle of patient autonomy. 
46. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 795. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. Much of the available evidence, however, points precisely in the opposite 
direction. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
SERVICE ch. 5 (1979); McClean, Learning about Death, 5 J. MED. ETHICS 67 (1979), both 
confirming that patients in the United Kingdom want information from their doctors and 
are resentful when they feel they are not being informed. See also REPORT OF THE 
HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER (1984-85), which confirms that the majority of com­
plaints to the Health Service Ombudsman concern failures of one sort or another in com­
munication between NHS caregivers and their patients. 
49. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 795. According to one commentator, English phy­
sicians would be unable to increase their practice of defensive medicine significantly be­
cause of fiscal constraints on the NHS. Grubb, supra note 40, at 243. 
50. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 796-97. 
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The attitudes of individual judges are important to appreciate the 
flavor of informed consent theory in England; although the trial judge 
and all eight of the judges who heard Sidaway on its two stages of 
appeal found for the defendant surgeon, their reasons for doing so va­
ried widely. Lord Scarman, who gave the first speech in the House of 
Lords, was the only one to embrace a standard of disclosure based on 
patients' rightS.51 Even he would have found for the defendant, how­
ever, because there was no direct evidence concerning materiality of 
the risk of spinal cord damage. 
Lord Scarman reasoned: 
Ifone considers the scope of the doctor's duty by beginning with the 
right of the patient to make his own decision ... the right to be 
informed of significant risks and the doctor's corresponding duty 
are easy to understand: for the proper implementation of the right 
requires that [a] ... doctor ... inform his patient of the material 
risks inherent in the treatment. 52 
He recognized situations in which the therapeutic privilege would jus­
tify a doctor in withholding information from a depressed or highly 
emotional patient, but came down squarely in favor of the prudent 
patient test. 53 If one read only Lord Scarman's opinion, or made the 
mistake of thinking that the first speech represented the rule of the 
case, one would receive precisely the wrong impression about the stan­
dard of disclosure for informed consent under English law. 
Lord Diplock and the rest of the Law Lords firmly rejected the 
transatlantic rule in favor of a physician-determined standard of dis­
closure. 54 Paradoxically, Lord Diplock noted in an elitist aside that 
the jUdiciary would not have to jostle with the common man for space 
on the Clapham omnibus. 
[W]hen it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and 
experience that a judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it 
natural for him to say (correctly) it is my right to decide whether 
any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to be fully 
51. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480, 
496. Lord Scarman is well known for his endorsement of the principle of disclosure in 
other contexts as well. See Scarman, The Right to Know, GRANADA GUILDHALL LEC­
TURE (1984); Home Office v. Harman, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 338, 350; see also Lee, Principle 
and Policy, 101 LAW Q. REV. 313, 315 (1985). 
52. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 494. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 500. For other analyses of the House of Lords Sidaway opinion, see Lee, 
Operating Under Informed Consent, 101 LAW Q. REV. 316 (1985); Schwartz & Grubb, 
supra note 34; Teff, supra note 10; Williams, Pre-Operative Consent and Medical Negli­
gence, 14 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 169 (1985). 
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informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am not al­
ready aware from my general knowledge as a highly educated man 
of experience, so that I may form my own judgment as to whether to 
refuse the advised treatment or not. 55 
Thus, Lord Diplock asserted that judges are entitled to be in­
formed about all material risks as a matter of course, whereas he spe­
cifically denied that right to the common man. He acknowledged that 
our bus rider would be entitled to equal treatment, however, if only he 
had the wit to ask for it. According to Lord Diplock, if a patient spe­
cifically questions his doctor about the risks of proposed treatment, 
"[n]o doubt. . . the doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient 
wanted to know ...."56 In other words, the standard of care de­
manded from the medical profession is to answer fully and truthfully, 
but only if a patient works up the nerve to ask the doctor to justify his 
advice. 
Lord Diplock again betrayed an attitude of superiority when it 
comes to assessing the impact of disclosure, for he said, "The only 
effect that mention of risks can have on the [ordinary] patient's mind 
... can be in the direction of deterring ... treatment which in the 
expert opinion of the doctor it is in the patient's [best] interest to un­
dergo."57 In Diplock's view paternalism is justified for the fearful 
rider of public transport, who cannot be expected to understand his 
own best interests. It would never do for judges, however, who are not 
willing to cede power to anyone else to determine what treatment is 
best for them. 
This, after all, is precisely the sticking point. Professor Katz re­
minds us that Pascal once said, "the heart has its reasons which reason 
knows nothing of" (p. 91). Lord Diplock understands that point per­
fectly well when it comes to making his own treatment decisions, but 
he is unwilling to grant the man on the Clapham omnibus the same 
opportunity to weigh his personal value system against medical opin­
ion. Perhaps he might do well to remember that bus riders as well as 
judges may have personal priorities about which their physicians are 
unaware. Moreover, they too may not value medical intervention per 
se as highly as does the medical profession. In any event, Lord 
Diplock's views seem considerably to the right of his brethren on the 
bench. 
Lord Bridge, joined by Lord Keith, agreed that when questioned 
55. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 500 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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by a patient a doctor must answer both truthfully and as fully as the 
questioner requires. 58 In the absence of questioning, however, he saw 
the extent of disclosure almost purely as a matter for clinical judg­
ment. Like the Master of the Rolls, he would reserve the right for the 
jUdiciary to overrule medical custom in situations where there was "a 
substantial risk of grave adverse consequences,"59 but as a general 
matter he considered it impractical to adopt a prudent patient stan­
dard of disclosure. To him, "the realities of the doctor/patient rela­
tionship" preclude true understanding of technical issues on the part 
of the patient.60 More importantly, however, they would lead to un­
predictability in litigation because Lord Bridge viewed the prudent pa­
tient standard as "so imprecise as to be almost meaningless."61 Bear 
in mind that under the English court system judges, not juries, would 
have to implement that allegedly elusive standard. Those same judges 
seem to have little trouble using the conduct of the man on the 
Clapham omnibus as the measuring rod for most other forms of negli­
gent behavior. 
In the final Sidaway opinion, Lord Templeman agreed with all of 
his brethren that, in the face of a patient's questions, a doctor must 
give honest answers.62 He then, however, said a curious thing in 
agreeing with Lords Diplock, Keith and Bridge that a professional 
standard of disclosure governed the case. He stated, "The relationship 
between doctor and patient is contractual in origin, the doctor per­
forming services in consideration for fees payable by the patient."63 He 
thought an obligation to provide all information available to the doc­
tor "would often be inconsistent with the doctor's contractual obliga­
tion to have regard to the patient's best interest."64 
Why did Lord Templeman analyze the issue in terms of fee-for­
service medicine when the plaintiff-along with ninety-three percent 
of the British population65-had received her medical care from the 
NHS where virtually no fees are involved? Perhaps all he really meant 
was that he sees the physician-patient relationship as contractual in 
origin: whether a doctor actually agrees with individual patients to 
58. Id. at 503-04. 
59. Id. at 505. 
60. Id. at 503-04. 
61. Id. at 504. 
62. "[T]he patient cannot complain of lack of information unless the patient asks in 
vain for more information ...." Id. at 507. 
63. Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
64. Id. 
65. (U.K.) OFFICE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, COMPENDIUM OF HEALTH STATISTICS 
§ 2, at 3 (1984). . 
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provide services for a price or simply undertakes to treat them as part 
of his contractual relationship with the NHS, his duty of care should 
be the same. Lord Templeman acknowledged the existence of some 
general duty to disclose the dangers of proposed treatment but, along 
with three of his brethren in the House of Lords, the trial judge, and 
all of the judges at the Court of Appeal level, deferred to the medical 
profession to determine which ones. 66 Presumably the jUdiciary still 
retains an oversight function for those cases where the medical stan­
dard of disclosure is too low for judges to countenance, but as a practi­
cal matter physicians determine the requirements for disclosure. 
C. Post-Sidaway Case Law 
Thus far only three reported cases have discussed the doctrine of 
informed consent in any detail since the House of Lords rendered its 
opinion in Sidaway, and all of them dealt with the issue of specific 
questioning by patients.67 In Lee v. South West Thames Regional 
Health Authority,68 the infant plaintiff suffered brain damage while 
receiving treatment either in the hospital or on the way to it in an 
ambulance. His mother sought a copy of an internal memorandum 
prepared for the defendant health authority concerning events which 
occurred during the ambulance ride. 69 The Court of Appeal refused 
to order discovery, on the ground that the memo was a privileged 
communication between a third party and the defendant, prepared for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice,1° 
The Master of the Rolls reached that conclusion "with undis­
guised reluctance, because ... there is something seriously wrong with 
the law if ... [the plaintiff's] mother cannot find out what exactly 
caused ... [the] brain damage."7l He then went on to suggest an 
unusual use of Sidaway's holding that a physician must answer a pa­
66. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 508·09. 
67. Newman v. Hounslow & Spelthorne Health Auth., (Apr. 17, 1985) (LEX IS, 
Enggen library, Cases file). The case was decided two months after the House of Lords 
decision in Sidaway was rendered. Newman discussed informed consent in the context of 
the Court of Appeal's Sidaway opinion. See also Thake & Another v. Maurice, [1986] 2 
W.L.R. 337; Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth. & Another, [1985] 3 
W.L.R. 830; Cornish v. Midland Bank pic, [1985] 3 All E.R. 513 (CA.); King v. King, 
(LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (Oct. 30, 1985); Lloyd Cheyham & Co. v. Littlejohn & 
Co., (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (Sept. 30, 1985). All of the above cases cite, but do 
not discuss, the House of Lords Sidaway decision. 
68. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 845 
(CA.). 
69. Id. at 847. 
70. Id. at 850. 
71. Id. 
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tient's questions about proposed treatment. He noted that if the medi­
cal profession is required to answer questions before treatment, there 
seemed to be no reason to distinguish its obligation when it came to 
answering patient questions after treatment about what actually took 
place.72 He went on to suggest that the plaintiff might be able to 
accomplish discovery through the circuitous route of a contract action 
for breach of the duty to inform. 73 
Although the Master of the Rolls demonstrated sensitivity to the 
possible ramifications of the Sidaway decision, his well-meant advice is 
probably faulty as far as actually compelling production of the docu­
ment is concerned. A plaintiff-patient might indeed be able to recover 
damages for breach of an implied contractual duty to inform. The 
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege militate strongly 
against specific performance of any contractual duty, however, insofar 
as it would be applied to compel disclosure of memoranda generated 
specifically for the purpose of potential litigation. Moreover, the duty 
to answer questions raised prior to treatment set forth in Sidaway is 
designed to protect the patient's right to decide whether to proceed 
with proposed therapy. That issue is no longer relevant after treat­
ment has been given, so any duty to answer questions after the fact 
cannot be premised solely on Sidaway's policy of promoting condi­
tional patient decisionmaking autonomy. 
The next reported decision discussing the Sidaway holdings was 
the trial court opinion in Blyth v. Bloomsbury Health Authority & An­
other.74 The case involved a health visitor7S whose doctor had pre­
scribed Depo-provera as a contraceptive following childbirth. The 
plaintiff had requested detailed information about the drug's side ef­
fects and about available alternatives, but her doctor told her only that 
there might be a little bleeding.76 In fact, a rather broad range of 
potential complications is associated with the drug. 
The court applied Sidaway to give judgment for the plaintiff, find­
ing that, "as she was someone with nursing qualifications who could be 
trusted not to act irrationally because ofwhat she was told, she was ... 
entitled to be given such information as was available to the hospi­
tal. "77 Note, however, the attitudes permeating the judge's choice of 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 851. 
74. (May 24, 1985) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
75. Health visitors are trained nurses employed by the NHS to provide community­
based outpatient care. 
76. Blyth, (LEX IS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
77. Id. (emphasis added). 
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words. The opinion implies that had the plaintiff not been a medical 
professional herself, she would not have been entitled to what Sidaway 
says is the right of every patient: to be given honest and truthful an­
swers to specific questions about proposed treatment. Moreover, the 
opinion implies that medical personnel need convey only the informa­
tion they happen to have, not the information they reasonably should 
know. Under Bolam, that is not a correct statement of a physician's 
general duty of care in England. 78 Presumably a doctor must know 
what other responsible physicians know in order to avoid liability for 
negligence. 
The latest opinion, Gold v. Haringey Health Authority,19 involved 
an unsuccessful tubal ligation performed on the plaintiff-patient in 
1979 to prevent pregnancy. The Queen's Bench took great pains to 
point out that the informed consent aspect of the case involved alleged 
negligence in a counselling context rather than the therapeutic milieu 
of Sidaway, and seems to have limited the Sidaway rule to therapeutic 
situations. The court found that the plaintiff had not been warned 
about the failure rate for tubal ligation, nor had she been advised 
about vasectomies or other forms of birth control and their relative 
rates of success. 80 
The court held that "in the context of someone seeking contra­
ceptive advice there was no such body of medical opinion [in 1979] 
which would have failed to mention that there was a risk of failure of 
. . . post partum sterilization or that vasectomy was an option or to 
make inquiries of the domestic situation of the party seeking advice."81 
For that reason, therefore, the defendants' conduct was deemed negli­
gent under the principles set forth in Bolam. 82 
The Gold court went on, however, to consider whether Sidaway 
would have compelled a defense finding if there had been a responsible 
body of medical opinion in 1979 which would have acted as did the 
defendants, in a counselling context. 83 Justice Schiemann explicitly 
stated that he did not consider himself bound by the professional stan­
78. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Man·agement Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582. 
79. (June 16, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
80. Id. 

S1. Id. 

82. Id. 
83. "It is not enough to show that there is a body of competent professional opinion 
which considers that there was a wrong decision if there also exists a body of professional 
opinion equally competent which supports the decision as reasonable in the circum­
stances." Id. (quoting Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Auth., [1984] 
W.L.R. 634, 638). 
I 
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dard of care.84 He analyzed the case as one involving the general 
solicitation of advice which simply happened to be medical, and found 
the hospital physicians under a duty to warn about the possibility of 
failure and to mention other contraceptive means.85 Thus, Sidaway 
was inapplicable and the defendants' conduct in failing to disclose was 
negligent.86 
Whether one can so easily carve contraceptive counselling out 
from under the umbrella of medical advice and thus avoid the harsh­
ness of the Sidaway rule is by no means clear. The court might have 
been on more solid ground analytically had it chosen to pursue 
Sidaway's lead that when patients ask questions physicians must give 
full and truthful answers. It could then have reached the same result 
without trying to exclude contraceptive counselling from the medical 
disclosure category. Surely when a patient asks medical personnel 
about contraception, a full answer would include a discussion of alter­
native means and their relative success rates. In any event, the Gold 
opinion signals lower court resistance to an expansive interpretation of 
Sidaway. 
II. CULTURAL AND FINANCIAL DIFFERENCES 
The National Health Service (NHS) is a socialized health care 
system which provides medical services essentially free of direct 
charge to British residents. 87 NHS general practitioners ordinarily 
practice medicine both physically and professionally removed from 
hospital-based specialists, or consultants. General Practitioners (GPs) 
deliver ninety per cent of NHS physician services, but they usually do 
not have hospital privileges. If their patients are sick enough to re­
quire specialist skills, GPs must route them to the appropriate consult­
ant and relinquish their care.88 
GPs are thus the gatekeepers to more specialized-and therefore 
more costly-medical services, which are not available in the same 
quantity as they are in the United States because of strict budgetary 
84. "Mr. Miller argued that ... I would be bound by Sidaway ... to discuss the 
Plaintiff's case. I do not agree with him." Id. 
85. Gold, (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
86. Id. 
87. See supra note 26. 
88. It is considered a breach of professional ethics under ordinary circumstances for 
a specialist to see a patient unless he or she has been referred by a general practitioner. 
GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE: FITNESS TO 
PRACTICE, Part III (iii) (G) (\983). 
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constraints.89 GPs have internalized the fact that not every NHS pa­
tient can have access to all the state-of-the-art medicine that might 
conceivably provide benefit; their referrals and treatment recommen­
dations necessarily are tempered by an understanding that patients 
must be cared for within a system in which medical resources are 
scarce. In fact, doctors are encouraged to take resource allocation ex­
plicitly into account in patient treatment decisions. This obviously in­
creases physician reluctance to volunteer the kind of complete 
information about treatment alternatives advocated by Professor Katz 
in The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient. The British Medical Asso­
ciation's Handbook ofMedical Ethics delicately expresses the point as 
follows: "Within the National Health Service resources are finite, and 
this may restrict the freedom of the doctor to advise his patients, who 
will usually be unaware of this limitation. This situation infringes 
upon the ordinary relationship between patient and doctor ...."90 
British health economist Alan Williams is more direct. He has 
warned that individual clinicians should not flinch from counting costs 
as well as benefits when determining health service availability. 
"Otherwise, if one person stands to benefit [by gaining access to medi­
cal care where the expense is grossly disproportionate to any expected 
benefit] then there is no limit to the sacrifices that others may properly 
be called upon to bear as a consequence."91 As the former Chief 
Medical Officer for the NHS put it, the system is designed to deliver 
"the most for the most and not everything for a few. "92 Both of those 
statements imply that the physician-not the patient-makes the 
treatment choice by determining who will have access to health re­
sources. According to at least one doctor, "[t]he key to turning down 
the patient is not to get eyeball to eyeball with him because if you do 
there is no way you can actually say no."93 In other words, the patient 
who knows about treatment alternatives is likely to demand them, but 
the system is not designed to accommodate patient choice-informed 
or not. 
The British population accepts such scarcity more readily than 
89. H. AARON & w. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING Hos­
PITAL CARE (1984). C/, Miller & Miller, supra note IS. 
90. THE BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ~ 
10.44 (1984) (emphasis added). 
91. Williams, Medical Ethics: Health Service Efficiency and Clinical Freedom, NUF­
FIELD!YORK PORTFOLIOS, Folio 2 (1984). 
92. Godber, Striking the Balance: Therapy, Prevention and Social Support, 3 WORLD 
HEALTH FORUM 285 (1982). 
93. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 107 (quoting an anonymous 
physician). 
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would its American counterpart for complex reasons, including the 
fact that patients incur virtually no direct costs for NHS care.94 They 
also tend to stoicism about their health, in part because "Britain is an 
original sin society in which illness and debility are seen as part of the 
natural order of things...."95 The stiff upper lip as an attribute of 
national character is not a myth, and aggressive pursuit of treatment 
alternatives through an expansive use of informed consent doctrine 
does not seem to fit comfortably with that image. The open dialogue 
advocated in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient might thus be 
more uncomfortable for English patients than it would be for most 
Americans. 
English physicians, on the other hand, tend to be more paternalis­
tic96 -sometimes even more autocratic97 -than their U.S. analogues. 
Several factors contribute to this situation. The English educational 
system long has separated out promising students for special treatment 
at early ages on the results of standardized examinations, and only 
recently have those tests become more egalitarian.98 Less than twenty 
per cent of the English population completes university,99 where both 
94. Great Britain funds the NHS from a central tax base, derived from general reve­
nues and National Insurance contributions supplemented by nominal patient charges for 
such items as prescription drugs and eyeglasses. At least one commentator has suggested 
that malpractice litigation in the U.S. simply constitutes a way of compensating injured 
patients for the lack of a well developed social welfare system and socialized medicine. 
Robertson, supra note 9, at 109. Other commentators suggest that since patients cannot be 
guaranteed access to all state-of-the-art therapy because of NHS resource constraints, Eng­
lish courts have been reluctant to expand the doctrine of informed consent. Schwartz & 
Grubb, supra note 34. 
95. Klein, Rationing Health Care, 289 BRIT. MED. J. 143 (1985). 
96. See, e.g., Brewin, Truth, Trust and Paternalism, 2 LANCET 490 (1985); Short, 
Some Consequences 0/ Granting Patients Access to Consultants' Records, 1 LANCET 1316 
(1986); Teff, supra note 10 at 443-45. But see Baum, Do We Need In/ormed Consent? 2 
LANCET 911 (1986). On paternalism in medicine, see generally C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, 
LAW AND ETHICS (1984); Matthews, Can Paternalism Be Modernized?, 12 J. MED. ETHICS 
133 (1986). On the attitude and training of British consultants, see D. PENDLETON, THE 
CONSULTATION (1984). On the point that British patients want more information than 
their physicians usually see fit to give them, see INST. OF MED. ETHICS BULL., Supp. No.3, 
Dec. 1986. 
97. See, e.g., Cowen, In the Rear and Limping a Little: Some Reflections on 
Medicine, Biotechnology and the Law: The Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEB. L. REV. 548, 
561 (1985) (describing a recent English neonate heart transplant wherein the cardiac sur­
geon allegedly admitted that the unprecedented operation was an experiment, but justified 
it by saying that all surgery advances by experiment). See also I. KENNEDY, THE UN­
MASKING OF MEDICINE (1983). 
98. On the new General Certificate of Secondary Education examination for 16 year 
olds which replaced the old system of O-levels (for advanced track) and CSE tests (for less 
bright students), see All Sheep, No Goats, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1986, at 53. 
99. See generally WHITTAKER'S ALMANAC 1064 (\986). 
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law and medicine are undergraduate subjects. Physicians (as well as 
most lawyers from whose ranks judges are chosen) come from this 
bright and privileged group. Having survived the rigid winnowing 
process, English doctors are accustomed to ego reinforcement and 
have been conditioned through special treatment to feel particularly 
confident about their medical judgments. As a corollary, they can 
seem condescending toward the ability of non-professionals to com­
prehend medical issues, and their judicial brethren have been known 
to share that attitude. loo 
Moreover, the jUdiciary often fosters societal deference to the sta­
tus of physicians. 101 In the lower court Sidaway opinion, for example, 
the Master of the Rolls commented on the conduct of the defendant­
surgeon as follows: "Bearing in mind that the plaintiff was not a pri­
vate patient, it is a great tribute to Mr. Falconer's compassion and 
interest that he [inquired as to the state of her health at all]. ..."102 
Under Professor Katz's model of shared decisionmaking, at least a 
modicum of compassion and interest would be mandatory attributes of 
physician-patient interaction. 
More troubling, particularly in the context of informed consent, 
was Lord Denning's famous summing up to the jury in Hatcher v. 
Black,103 thirty-odd years ago. That case concerned a BBC broad­
caster who was no longer able to speak properly after a thyroid opera­
tion. The plaintiff-patient specifically had asked her doctors whether 
there was any possibility of vocal cord damage inherent in the surgery, 
and had been reassured that there was not. 104 Lord Denning told the 
jury: "In short, ... [the doctor] told a lie, but he did it because he 
thought in the circumstances it was justifiable. If this were a court of 
morals, this would raise a nice question ... [but] the law leaves this 
question of morals to the conscience of the doctor."105 Hatcher was 
overruled by Sidaway, but judicial deference to physicians persists in 
100. See particularly Lord Diplock's opinion in Sidaway, discussed in supra text ac­
companying notes 52-55. 
IO\. For an account of the tortuous intellectual and social pathway to the English 
bench, see Megarry, Barristers and Judges in England Today, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 387 
(1982). 
102. Sidaway v. Board of Govemors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778, 
782 (C.A.). 
103. The Times (London), July 2, 1954, at 6, col. \. Lord Denning's summing up is 
reprinted in A. T. DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW, 242-49 (1979). Hatcher v. 
Black was decided before the right to jury trial in personal injury cases was abolished. See 
supra note 16. 
104. Hatcher, The Times (London), July 2, 1954, at 6, col. \. 

lOS. A. T. DENNING, supra note 104, at 243. 
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more subtle form through the professional standard of disclosure. 106 
III. "THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT" 

AND ENGLISH LAW 

What are we to make of the varying shades of English judicial 
opinion on the subject of informed consent in light of the special cir­
cumstances surrounding health care delivery in England? More to the 
point, how do they correspond with the model of shared decisionmak­
ing proposed by The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient? One thing is 
quite clear. The English medical profession initially controls the phy­
sician-patient interaction to limit the amount of information which 
must be conveyed to patients, a situation at odds with Professor Katz's 
ideal. If patients assert themselves to ask questions, however, the bal­
ance of power shifts. Doctors must then respond fully and truthfully 
to their patients' concerns. 
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient makes an eloquent plea 
for just such dialogue between physicians and their charges, so that 
decisions about medical care can be produced through an openly 
shared process of evaluation. Professor Katz points out that idiosyn­
cratic patient values often are ignored when physicians dominate the 
decisionmaking process, but he also warns that medical issues can eas­
ily be misunderstood when patients insist on total control. He knows 
the sacrifices required on both sides for a true dialogue to take place­
physicians must expose their uncertainty and patients must be willing 
to bear the emotional burdens of that same doubt-and he does not 
underestimate the time and effort required for open communication. 
Nonetheless, Professor Katz convinces this reader that the results 
are worthwhile for both sides. Physicians are released from the strain 
of having to appear omnipotent when they know only too well that 
they are not, and patients usually gain emotional strength when they 
are able to exert a greater degree of mastery over decisions that deeply 
affect their lives. These benefits should apply on both sides of the At­
lantic. Moreover, the potential for medical malpractice litigation is 
reduced by a sharing of information, because when patients are aware 
of potential consequences before embarking on courses of treatment, 
they are less likely to complain when something goes wrong or a 
hoped-for result does not materialize. That point holds true for both 
English and American patients, notwithstanding the "American dis­
106. See. e.g., supra text accompanying note 51. 
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ease." \07 More open communication might also increase political 
pressure for more generous and efficient resource allocation within the 
NHS. 
English law, however, seems not to appreciate the full logic of 
Professor Katz's analysis. Nor, for the most part, does the English 
medical profession. Both doctors and judges often seem to believe that 
English patients do not want to know the truth, and that it would hurt 
them if they did. The sense of paternalism pervading many public 
pronouncements from both the medical profession and the judiciary 
reflects a different attitude toward the structuring of society and to­
ward the responsibilities of its members to one another than is usually 
articulated publicly in this country. It also dovetails neatly with the 
reality of less abundant medical resources in the English welfare state. 
At some level, doctors and judges may think it makes little sense for 
patients to know all about alternative forms of treatment when as a 
practical matter some of them simply may be unavailable. 
Even though some of the Sidaway opinions contain dicta to the 
effect that judges retain the right to second-guess whether doctors 
have disclosed enough information, the thrust of the case undercuts 
the primacy of patient choice-respect for individual autonomy, dig­
nity, and integrity-that constitutes the heart of Professor Katz's anal­
ysis. English law, in common with that of many American 
jurisdictions, makes no representation that patients will enjoy a pro­
cess of informed reflection as they make medical choices. Indeed, by 
adopting a physician-oriented standard of disclosure English law pro­
ceeds from the assumption that doctor knows best. 
Even though in the wake of Sidaway the English medical profes­
sion initially controls the information flow to patients, Professor 
Katz's ideal of shared decisionmaking could easily gain momentum. \08 
According to Sidaway, patients can shed their dun-brown dependent 
status merely by asserting their prerogative to ask questions. Once 
they have done that, they acquire the bright plumage of that rara avis, 
the prudent patient. From then on, Sidaway teaches that they must be 
told everything that would be material and relevant to the man on the 
107. See Note, The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus, 47 MOD. L. REV. 454, 466-67 
(1984). 
108. Research on the impact of the Canadian Supreme Court's adoption of the pru­
dent patient standard of disclosure in Reibl v. Hughes, 114 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1980), however, is 
not encouraging with respect to changing physician behavior. See Robertson, Informed 
Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 139 (1984). For a U.S. 
study suggesting that judicial decisions may produce only marginal changes in health pro­
vider behavior, see Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An 
Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345 (1981). 
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Clapham omnibus who is accustomed to taking responsibility for his 
own decisions. And the mere process of communicating is likely to 
increase the amount of information that doctors volunteer thereafter. 
Perhaps as this becomes better understood by patients and doctors it 
will seem less threatening to both. By communicating more openly 
they may even find that they agree on the direction the bus should 
take. Although the route might be circuitous, Professor Katz would 
at least approve of the result. 
